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I
INTRODUCTION
The Lanham Act' is fifty. By some measures at least, it has been an
extraordinary success. This essay briefly recounts that success and speculates
about its origins. It then worries that the dynamics of federal trademark
legislation are changing and that, in the future, such success may be more
elusive. The new Trademark Dilution Act2 illustrates the danger.
II
THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS
A. The Success of the Lanham Act
Statutes are judged most directly by how well they promote the goals or cure
the mischiefs prompting their enactment. This essay leaves to others any such
direct assessment of the Lanham Act. Instead, this appraisal of the Act's
success rests on circumstantial evidence: the influence of the Act beyond the
statute's technical boundaries and its remarkable stability over half a century.
Statutes need not persuade. They are commands from the sovereign to be
followed without regard to their wisdom or good sense. However, when appeals
are made to a statutory rule in circumstances not technically governed by the
statute, the good sense of the legislation is very much at issue. Thus, the
enormous influence of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code-technically
applicable only to transactions in goods-on the general law of contracts
provides convincing evidence of its substantive merit.3 The Lanham Act has
proven to be similarly persuasive beyond the borders of its jurisdiction.
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1. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(1994)).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
3. Compare, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-302, -609 (modifying the common law) with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 208, 251 (1981) (tracking the U.C.C. rules).
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Federal trademark legislation does not displace state trademark law. Indeed,
with some exaggeration, the Lanham Act is often viewed primarily as a vehicle
for the federal registration of state-created rights. In trademark infringement
actions under state statutes or at common law, the Lanham Act is usually
relevant only by analogy. Nevertheless, over the past fifty years, the influence
of the Lanham Act on the development of state trademark law has been
enormous, at least if we can take the Restatement of Torts (1938) as representa-
tive of state trademark law before the implementation of the Lanham Act and
the new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995) as representative of
current law.
The most notable achievement of the Lanham Act may be its role in
developing what might be called a unified theory of trademarks-a single set of
substantive principles applicable across the spectrum of protectable subject
matter. Trademark law originated in the common law action of deceit.
Imitation of a trademark by a competitor was viewed as a type of misrepresen-
tation. This particular form of deceit came to be called "unfair competition,"
and proof of the defendant's fraudulent intent was a crucial element of the
cause of action.4 When the imitated mark was especially distinctive, such as an
invented or arbitrarily chosen symbol of identification, the inference that the
defendant's imitation was intended to deceive prospective purchasers evolved
into a conclusive presumption of fraud. By the mid-nineteenth century, courts
in England and the United States had come to characterize the plaintiff's
interest in such a mark as a "property right,"5 and the marks themselves came
to be called "trademarks." Complaints of unauthorized trademark use became
actions for "trademark infringement."
Less distinctive designations, such as terms describing the qualities of the
goods or their geographic origin, can also come to identify for consumers the
goods of a particular seller. At common law, these symbols became known as
"trade names."6 Trade names were not technically trademarks, and rights in
trade names could not be vindicated through an action for trademark
infringement. Sellers complaining of the unauthorized use of trade names were
left to the action of unfair competition with its traditional emphasis on a
defendant's fraudulent intent. The distinction between trademarks and trade
names also carried a variety of other substantive consequences.7 Although
there had been attempts at a more integrated approach,8 the historical
bifurcation between trademarks and trade names that had complicated the law
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. d (1995) [hereinafter UNFAIR
COMPETITION RESTATEMENT).
5. See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879).
6. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 715 (1938) [hereinafter TORTS RESTATEMENT] (definition
of trademark) with id. § 716 (definition of trade name).
7. The distinctions between "trademarks" and "trade names" were critically reviewed in an
influential article by Milton Handler and Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis
and Synthesis (pts. 1 & 2), 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 759 (1930).
8. See, e.g., TORTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 717 cmt. a.
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for a century was still firmly embedded in the common law at the enactment of
the Lanham Act.
Packaging and product features also contributed to the fragmentation of the
common law. The manner in which goods are packaged or the physical
appearance of the goods themselves can sometimes serve as an indication of the
source of the product. Although rights in such distinctive "trade dress" could
be raised in an action for unfair competition, trade dress was neither a
trademark nor a trade name, and protection at common law was governed by
yet another collection of substantive rules.9
The Lanham Act opted for an integrated approach to trade symbols. The
definitions in section 45 of the Act, together with the criteria governing the
registration of marks in section 2, swept away the arcane distinctions between
trademarks and trade names. Judicial interpretation also brought trade dress
and product features within the registration system established by the Lanham
Act." All were now governed by the single standard of infringement in
section 32. The impact on state law was dramatic. Within a few years, a Model
State Trademark Bill" was prepared on the pattern of the Lanham Act. It
quickly became the standard for state trademark legislation. The Lanham Act's
approach proved equally persuasive in the courts, and the common law of
trademarks gradually abandoned its archaic terminology and the substantive
distinctions that it had engendered.1 2 The unified model inaugurated by the
Lanham Act is now the standard paradigm of modern trademark law.
The ability to license, another significant development traceable in large
measure to the Lanham Act, has added immeasurably to the economic value of
modern trademarks. As originally understood, trademarks were symbols
indicating the physical origin of goods. This view led many early courts to rule
that a trademark owner could not license others to use the mark without
destroying its significance as an indication of source; licenses were invalid as a
fraud on the public, and licensors risked judicial forfeiture of their trademark
rights through a finding of intentional abandonment. 3  Over time, an
alternative view of trademarks (and one more conducive to licensing) made
some headway. Trademarks could be understood as indications, not necessarily
of physical origin, but of a more general connection between the trademark
owner and the trademarked goods. The presence of a trademark can be viewed
as an indication of consistency and quality assured through the trademark
9. See, e.g., id §§ 741-43.
10. See UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 16 cmt. a & accompanying reporters'
note.
11. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL (1949, revised 1964, 1992), reprinted in 3 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22.04 (3d ed. 1995).
12. Compare TORTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 715-16 (former common law definitions of
trademark and trade name) with UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, §§ 9 cmt. g, 16
(adopting the Lanham Act definitions).
13. See UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 33 cmt. a and accompanying
reporters' note.
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owner's control over the use of the mark. Thus, a few courts upheld licenses
if the trademark owner retained sufficient control to ensure that the marked
goods met the expectations created by the appearance of the trademark.14
However, at the time of the enactment of the Lanham Act, the question of
licensing was still unsettled, 5 and the resulting uncertainty undoubtedly
inhibited the efficient exploitation of trademarks. Through its rule in section 5
that the use of a mark by "related companies" inures to the benefit of the
trademark owner, the Lanham Act explicitly authorized the licensing of marks,
backed by a definition of "related company" that incorporated the control
requirement. The common law quickly adopted a similar position.
1 6
Other examples of the Lanham Act's persuasiveness might be listed,
including the Act's effect on the common law rules governing the type of use
necessary to acquire trademark rights" and its role in refining the concept of
trademark abandonment." Of greater significance is the leading role played
by the Lanham Act in the development of the modern law of deceptive market-
ing.1
9
Durability is another measure of legislative success. The stability of the
Lanham Act in the face of changing markets and merchandising strategies has
been impressive. The statute has successfully assimilated new advertising media,
a marked increased in corporate diversification, the expansion of trademark
licensing (including the phenomenon of franchising), and the continuing shift
from local to national, and now to international marketing.
During its fifty years, the Lanham Act has been amended some twenty-six
times. Most of these bills, however, encompassed only conforming amendments
or modest procedural changes. By my count, there have been just eleven
14. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp., 167 F.2d 484 (C.C.P.A. 1948);
Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 F. 513 (8th Cir. 1916).
15. See, e.g., American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1941) (questioning the
ability to license); Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, Inc., 3 F.2d 7 (8th Cir. 1924) (same).
16. See UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 33. The treatment of trademark law
in the Restatement of Torts (1938) did not include a section on trademark licensing.
17. Compare TORTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 718 (trademark must be affixed to the goods)
with UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 18 cmt. d (abandoning the former rule
requiring physical affixation of the mark).
18. Compare TORTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 752 (emphasizing an intent to abandon) with
UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 30 cmt. b (intent to retain rights will not avoid
abandonment).
19. Compare TORTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 761 cmt. a (requiring proof of a direct diversion
of sales from the plaintiff) with post-Lanham Act formulations such as the UNIFORM DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3(a), 7A U.L.A. 265, 289-90 (1996) (adopting a "likely to be damaged"
standard). In some states, competitors can also pursue deceptive marketing claims under the Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (1970). COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 26
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 141 (1970); see UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4,
§ 1 statutory note. The common law rules on deceptive marketing may now also coincide with those
in § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 19. See idt § 2 cmt. b. As a result of the 1988 revision of the Lanham
Act that brought disparagement of another's product within the scope of the deceptive marketing rules
in § 43(a), common law liability for product disparagement may be the next area to respond to statutory
innovations in the Lanham Act. See id. cmt. c.
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substantive amendments to the Act.' Only one, the Trademark Revision Act
of 1988, might be judged a major revision.21 Although relatively modest in
scope, the second most comprehensive amendment (and the only one to tinker
with the general standard of infringement) dates back to 1962.22 This stability
can be contrasted with the tumultuous history of the federal copyright statute.
Since the enactment of a thorough-going revision in 1976, the Copyright Act
has endured almost twice as many substantive amendments in its twenty years
as the Lanham Act has experienced in a half-century.
B. Origins of Success
Why has the Lanham Act succeeded? In contrast to copyright, its success
is surely attributable in some measure to trademark's relative immunity from
the stresses generated by new technologies. However, there may be a deeper
reason: The Lanham Act, despite its innovations, is in essence a codification.
The Lanham Act has embraced the balance of interests drawn over more than
a century of common law adjudication. The common law rules defining a
protectable mark as well as the common law's concept of infringement and the
trademark rights that the concept delineates are all preserved in the federal
legislation. Putting aside statutory innovations directly linked to the public
notice provided by the Act's registration system,24 the Lanham Act codifies the
20. I count the following: (1) Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-333, 75 Stat. 748 (effect of
applications for foreign registration); (2) Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769
(modifying, inter alia, the standard of confusion governing registration and infringement); (3) Act of
Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-600, 88 Stat. 1955 (awards of attorneys fees); (4) Trademark Counterfeiting
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 1501-03, 98 Stat. 2179, 2179-83 (remedies for trademark counterfeit-
ing); (5) Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, §§ 101-04, 98 Stat. 3335, 3335-36
(determination of generic status); (6) Trademark Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat.
3935 (including intent to use provisions and amendments to § 43(a)); (7) Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3568 (liability of states for infringement); (8)
NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2114 (restrictions on registration
of certain geographic designations); (9) Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465,
108 Stat. 4981 (geographic indications on wines and spirits and presumption of abandonment); (10)
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (protection against dilution
of distinctiveness); and (11) Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153,
110 Stat. 1386 (enhancing remedies against counterfeiters).
21. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988).
22. Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 773 (1962) (eliminating the former requirement in § 32(1) that
confusion "deceive purchasers as to the source of origin" of the goods or services).
23. Even as originally enacted, the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, was
nearly three times as long as the 1909 Act that it replaced. It is now approaching six times the length
of its predecessor.
24. Until the recent dilution amendment, most of the Lanham Act's major substantive innovations
could be rationalized as outgrowths of the public notice afforded by the Act's registration system. Thus,
the geographic expansion of trademark rights beyond the user's actual market through the concept of
constructive notice reflected in 15 U.S.C.A. § 1072 and the loss of specified defenses not raised in time
to prevent an owner's rights from being "incontestable" in 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1065 and 1115(b) can both
be justified on the basis of an accessible public record of the trademark owner's claim. The ability since
the 1988 revision to establish rights prior to actual use of the mark through an intent-to-use application
can be justified on the same basis. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051(b), 1057(c) (West Supp. 1996); 3
MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 26.15, at 26-58 to -59.
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basic common law principles governing both the subject matter and scope of
protection. That may be the Lanham Act's fundamental strength, since there
are reasons to believe that, in the long run, courts will make better trademark
law than legislatures.
To be successful, trademark law must respond effectively to complex and
sometimes inconsistent interests. Protection against infringement reduces the
cost to consumers of acquiring reliable information about the source of a
product and, hence, about its anticipated characteristics and quality. Protection
also encourages investment in good will by ensuring trademark owners the
opportunity to capture the rewards of a favorable reputation. But trademark
law must also be responsive to the public interest in competition. Excessive
protection can inhibit the communication of useful information by other sellers
in the marketplace, and rights in packaging and product features can deprive
competitors of access to elements crucial to effective competition. As trade
symbols enter the general vocabulary, the law must also take account of the
constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech. These latter
interests-the interests weighing against protection-are more likely to be
represented effectively in common law adjudication than in the legislative
process.
In trademark litigation, one party or the other will typically find it expedient
to cloak itself tightly in the public interest. However, an adversarial process
forces attention on pros and cons of such interests. The judiciary may
systematically err in one direction or another, but usually not for lack of
exposure to the real or imagined interests at issue.
The legislative process is more problematic. Owners of well-known
trademarks are generally well-off and well-organized. They are important
constituents in every political district, and their lobbying capabilities are
impressive. Their chief trade organization, the United States (now Internation-
al) Trademark Association, was single-handedly responsible for the 1988
Trademark Revision Act. On the other hand, small market entrants looking for
a leg up, manufacturers specializing in knock-offs, supermarket shoppers, and
parodists (let alone t-shirt bootleggers) are not, as a general matter, well
represented in the legislative process." At best, they are left in the unenviable
position of relying on testimony by public-spirited academic economists, or even
An obvious exception is the liability created under § 43(a) for deceptive advertising. This legislative
expansion of common law liability may be more easily defended than those relating to trademark rights.
See infra note 27.
25. Commenting at a Senate hearing on the 1988 Revision Bill, Beverly W. Pattishall, well-known
trademark attorney and long-time supporter of dilution protection, see Beverly W. Pattishall, The
Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U. L.
REv. 618 (1976); Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trademark-
Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289 (1984), opined, "I can't think of any group that
would do anything but either ignore it or endorse it." 35 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
403, 405 (1988). The organized media sometimes accounts for an exception to the general under-
representation of the anti-protectionist position, but its interests are usually too narrow to provide
comprehensive balance.
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law professors.2 6 This imbalance is troubling, whether we view the legislative
process as a rational balancing of interests in furtherance of the general welfare
or as a market in legislation.27 From this perspective, a legislative strategy
built on the codification of common law trademark principles is appealing-an
intuition that the Lanham Act has generally heeded for fifty years. Unfortu-
nately, this welcome conservatism, overwhelmed by an increasing fixation on
international markets, may be ending.
Attention to the international dimension of intellectual property law is
altogether prudent, to a point. For trademarks, the Paris Convention has long
been the principal international treaty. Members, including the United States,
promise national treatment for citizens of other member states and also agree
to maintain at least a specified minimum level of trademark protection. More
recently, there have been moves to harmonize trademark registration procedures
(the Trademark Law Treaty) and to create a central application system for
foreign registrations (the Madrid Protocol).' In addition, the recent NAFTA
and GATT trade agreements both produced modest changes to the federal
trademark statute.29 The difficulty lies, however, not so much in statutory
amendments implementing formal treaty obligations, but in impassioned pleas
for ever-increasing protection rationalized by assertions about foreign revenues
and trade balances.
26. Ralph Brown of the Yale Law School, my co-author in copyright (see infra note 35), was one
of the few persons to testify in opposition to portions of the 1988 Trademark Revision Act. See 36 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 489, 490 (1988).
27. On the latter view, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
Copyright revision may reflect yet another model of the legislative process. Unlike trademarks, both
owners and users of copyrighted subject matter are well organized. Much of the 1976 Copyright Act
and its subsequent amendments were drafted, not by legislators or their staffs, but by affected interest
groups during protracted negotiations. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987). Groups not at the table were frequently shortchanged. See
Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).
Consideration of deceptive advertising issues under the Lanham Act is not hobbled by the imbalance
in representation that plagues trademark issues. Large companies can as easily find themselves on one
side of advertising complaints as on the other, and here the media is also a consistent player in the
legislative process.
28. Neither treaty has been ratified by the United States. See generally Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda
B. Samuels, The Changing Landscape of International Trademark Law, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 433 (1993-94); Roger E. Schechter, Facilitating Trademark Registration Abroad: The Implications
of U.S. Ratification of the Madrid Protocol, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 419 (1991).
29. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4981 (geographic
indications on wines and spirits; presumption of abandonment); NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2114 (registration of geographic designations). Cf Peter M. Brody,
Protection of Geographical Indications in the Wake of TRIPs: Existing United States Laws and the
Administration's Proposed Legislation, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 520 (1994) (arguing that additional changes
relating to geographic designations may be necessary to comply with the Uruguay Agreement); Elke
E. Werner, Comment, Are We Trading Our Lanham Act Away? An Evaluation of Conflicting Provisions
Between the NAFTA and North American Trademark Law, 2 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 227 (1995)
(arguing that further changes in American trademark law are necessary to conform to NAFTA).
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There are trade-based arguments for increased domestic intellectual property
protection suitable for every occasion. When the level of intellectual property
protection in a foreign country is higher than in the United States, American
works marketed in that country are sometimes limited on a reciprocity rationale
to the lower level of protection available here. Thus, the argument is
straightforward: Raise the level of protection for works at home, and Americans
will suddenly earn billions more through expanded rights abroad.
The current push to extend the term of copyright protection from an already
handsome life-of-the-author plus fifty years to life plus seventy years epitomizes
the prevailing logic. In order to harmonize the term of copyright within the
European Union, the Union issued a directive for a life-plus-seventy-year term
to match the German law, which had the longest copyright term in Europe.
Protection of American works sold in Europe, however, would still be limited
by our own life-plus-fifty term. The argument for extension was clear: How
can we afford to pass up twenty additional years of foreign royalties on
American songs, books, and movies?3" Opponents of the extension have been
forced to rely on law professors to make the point that increased protection has
costs as well as benefits.31 A similar argument based on lost economic
opportunities in foreign markets has been made to support the push for a public
performance right in sound recordings.32 The recently passed amendment to
the Copyright Act creating a narrow performance right for digital transmissions
of sound recordings33 is unlikely to win performance protection for U.S.
recordings abroad; thus, the pressure for increased domestic protection will
undoubtedly continue. Acknowledging the political opposition to wider
protection, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks raised the trade
argument to its ultimate plane by suggesting that, in order to obtain increased
30. "If the Congress does not extend to Americans the same copyright protection afforded their
counterparts in Europe, American creators will have 20 years less protection than their European
counterparts-20 years during which Europeans will not be paying Americans for their copyrighted
works." 141 Cong. Rec. E379 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead). At a Senate
hearing on the proposed extension, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Bruce Lehman lamented
that the disparity between U.S. and foreign copyright terms "leaves a lot of money on the table." 50
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 589, 590 (1995). The most interesting response to the
extension issue came from Senator Dodd, who proposed auctioning off the 20 years of added
protection, with the proceeds going to the National Endowments for the Arts and the Humanities. 140
Cong. Rec. S12619 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1994).
31. Professor Peter Jaszi of American University was the only witness to testify in opposition to
the extension bill at a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 50 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 589, 591 (1995). Professor Dennis Karjala of Arizona State carried the burden
of opposition before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property. Id. at 282, 283.
32. "Due to the lack of a performance right in the United States, U.S. performers and record
companies are denied their fair share of foreign royalty pools for the public performance of U.S. sound
recordings in some countries and are in danger of losing access to their share in others." Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and
the National Information Infrastructure 222-23 (1995).
33. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336.
The amendment covers only certain digital audio transmissions.
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protection for sound recordings under domestic law, "we may have to negotiate
a treaty that requires those changes in U.S. law.
3 4
Perhaps surprisingly, trade-based arguments are popular even when the
domestic law of the United States provides the same or greater protection than
foreign law. Enactment of increased domestic protection, it is said, shows our
good faith and strengthens the hand of our negotiators pressing for greater
protection of American works abroad. This holier-than-thou attitude seems
nothing short of miraculous to those who remember the American position prior
to the 1980s. For decades, the United States showed little embarrassment in
preaching the virtues of strong intellectual property protection abroad while
lingering with the sinners outside the Berne Convention, which serves as the
chief international agreement on copyright.35
Regardless of the relative levels of domestic and foreign protection, the lure
of increased revenues from abroad creates unremitting pressure to expand the
scope of intellectual property protection at home. The Lanham Act is not
immune to these arguments. They may well have tipped the balance in the case
of the recent dilution amendment.
III
THE TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
A. Dilution Theory
On January 16, 1996, President Clinton signed the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act.36 Similar legislation had failed several years before when
proposed as part of the Trademark Revision Act of 1988. The earlier failare
was attributable in part to the opposition of Congressman Robert Kastenmeier,
then chair of the House subcommittee that considered the 1988 bill.37
However, in addition to the departure of Congressman Kastenmeier, another
major change was evident when the dilution issue resurfaced in 1995.
Arguments relating to trademark protection in foreign markets, noticeably
absent during consideration of this aspect of the 1988 bill, appeared now at
every stage of the legislative process. At a House hearing, the Administration
supported the dilution bill on foreign trade grounds and opposed a provision
limiting the bill to federally registered marks by arguing that the limitation
34. 50 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 244, 245 (1995) (testimony of Bruce Lehman
before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property).
35. Even when the United States did join Berne in 1988, we adopted a "minimalist" approach with
respect to our obligations under the Convention. RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES
ON COPYRIGHT 709 (6th ed. 1995).
36. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
37. See Jerome Gilson, A Federal Dilution Statute: Is It Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 108, 114
(1993).
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"clearly undercuts the United States'[s] position with its trading partners. '' 31
On the floor of the House, Congresswoman Pat Schroeder argued that a more
limited bill "is not within the spirit of the United States position as a leader
setting the standards for strong worldwide protection of intellectual proper-
ty."'39 In the Senate, Senator Orrin Hatch said that the bill would "assist the
executive branch in its bilateral and multilateral negotiations with other
countries to secure greater protection for the famous marks owned by U.S.
companies."' Senator Patrick Leahy spoke of "strengthen[ing] the hand of
our international negotiators."'"
The Lanham Act in new subsection 43(c) now protects the owner of a
"famous" mark from a commercial use that "causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the famous mark."42 "Dilution" is in turn defined as "the lessening
of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,"
without regard to the presence of competition between the users or the
likelihood of confusion among consumers. 43 Unlike the traditional likelihood
of confusion standard, the concept of "dilution" is not a product of the common
law. It is borrowed instead from statutory formulations found in about half of
the states.
38. 50 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 325 (1995) (testimony of Commissioner of
Trademarks Philip Hampton before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property).
The limitation was eventually dropped. Id. at 344-45.
39. 141 Cong. Rec. H14318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995). The inclusion of unregistered marks
undercuts any attempt to link the dilution amendment to the public notice function of the federal
statute. See supra note 24.
40. 141 Cong. Rec. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995). Senator Hatch also made a more direct appeal
to international considerations in support of the bill, arguing that "the GATT agreement includes a
provision designed to provide dilution protection to famous marks." Id. The provision in question is
Article 16(3) of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"),
a component of the GATT Uruguay Round. Article 16(3) extends the protection against imitations of
well-known marks on identical or similar goods contained in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention to use
on dissimilar goods or services if the use "would indicate a connection between those goods or services
and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that the interests of the owner of the
registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use." Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OFTHE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M.
81, 89-90 (1994). It is not at all clear that this provision requires enactment of a federal dilution statute.
See Jerome H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the
TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345, 363 (1995). The protection afforded
under American statutory and common law against uses on noncompeting goods that are likely to cause
confusion as to sponsorship, approval, or other association, see UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT,
supra note 4, §§ 20 cmt. d, 21 cmt. j, might itself be sufficient to satisfy our treaty responsibilities,
especially in light of the minimalist position often adopted by the U.S. with respect to its obligations
under intellectual property conventions. See supra note 35. In addition, half of the states already have
dilution statutes, and this existing legislation might be sufficient under TRIPS. Reliance on state law
was used to justify the absence of a federal moral rights statute at the time of our adherence to the
Beme Convention. See BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 35, at 709. Further, the federal dilution
amendment was not included as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, 108 Stat. 4981, which made only two minor changes to the Lanham Act. See supra note 20.
41. 141 Cong. Rec. S19312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995).
42. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 1996).
43. Id. § 1127 (West Supp. 1996).
THOUGHTS ON TRADEMARK
Frustrated by the reluctance of courts and legislatures in the early decades
of the century to extend liability for trademark infringement to uses on non-
competing goods, some commentators, most notably Frank Schechter," urged
a new rationale for protection. The primary value of a trade symbol was seen
as its power to generate sales, and that value should be protected against the
"gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public
mind by its use upon non-competing goods."45 Only a few decisions actually
acknowledged this interest,' 6 and subsequent case law and legislation, including
the Lanham Act, reflected a more modest expansion of protection against use
on non-competing goods through an extension of the confusion rationale.
However, beginning in 1947 with Massachusetts, a number of states enacted
statutes directly adopting the dilution rationale.47
State dilution acts have been invoked against two distinct threats to the
value of a trademark. For marks that are highly distinctive (or "famous"
according to subsection 43(c)), use by another to identify different goods or
services undermines or blurs the association between the symbol and the former
user. Protection against this dilution of distinctiveness is the central theme of
the state statutes. 48 However, the value of a trademark can also be reduced
by a use that "tarnishes" the image of the symbol or disparages the mark or its
owner. Thus, dilution statutes also have been invoked to enjoin uses found to
burden the symbol with negative associations that lessen its value to the original
user.
49
Protection against the dilution of a mark's distinctiveness is self-limiting.
Only unauthorized use of a mark to identify the goods or services of someone
other than the trademark owner will blur the association between the symbol
and the initial user. Use of the mark instead to refer back to the trademark
owner or its products serves only to confirm rather than undermine the existing
associational significance of the symbol. Thus, the dilution of distinctiveness
rationale encompasses only unauthorized use as a trademark.
The tarnishment rationale, however, is not similarly limited. The positive
image enjoyed by a mark can, of course, be tarnished by unauthorized use as
a trademark on inferior or inappropriate products. But the image can also be
44. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1927).
45. Id at 825. Modem economic analysis has not been supportive of the dilution rationale. See,
e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. &
ECON. 265, 306-09 (1987); William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 199, 284-86 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947); Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
47. At current count, dilution statutes have been enacted in 27 states. See UNFAIR COMPETITION
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 25 statutory note, with the addition of Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
§ 325D.165 (1995), and South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1165 (Law. Co-op 1996).
48. For a useful analysis of this branch of the state dilution statutes, see Mead Data Cent., Inc. v.
Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
49. The state statutes typically encompass a "likelihood of injury to business reputation." See
MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 12 (1964).
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tarnished when the mark is used to refer back to the trademark owner in the
course of commentary, criticism, or parody directed at the owner, at the owner's
products, or at the mark itself. However, any application of the dilution
rationale to provide relief from harm to the value of a trademark inflicted by
unwelcome speech, whether commercial or noncommercial, raises substantial
constitutional and public policy issues.
Two recent cases, one noncommercial, the other involving a competitor,
illustrate the problem. In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications," the
publisher of a humor magazine ran afoul of Missouri's dilution statute when,
using a number of Anheuser-Busch trademarks, it published a parody advertise-
ment for a product called Michelob Oily. The advertisement, with various
references to oil pollution, ran soon after the occurrence of an oil spill in the
Gasconade River, a water supply for Anheuser-Busch, which apparently forced
the temporary closing of the company's St. Louis brewery. Relying on the
tarnishment rationale, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit said that the
trademarks were injured by "a negative, although vague, statement about the
quality of the product represented by the trademark."51 The court rejected a
first amendment defense.
In Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,52 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction issued under the New York
dilution statute against a competing manufacturer of lawn tractors that had the
temerity to poke fun at Deere's leaping deer logo. In a comparative advertise-
ment intended to inform consumers that its tractors were just as good as a
Deere but less costly, the defendant animated the Deere logo and chased it
from the scene with one of its own Yard-Man tractors, assisted by a barking dog
recognizable, as the district court found, "as a breed that is short in stature.
53
Although indicating that "[s]atirists, selling no product other than the
publication that contains their expression" have wider latitude (and, more
grudgingly, that sellers of non-competing products probably do too),' the court
said that the degree and nature of the alterations made to the plaintiff's
trademark by a direct competitor went too far. The court appeared largely
unconcerned with the truth or falsity or even the content of the message that
the advertisement actually conveyed to consumers.
The proper interpretation of state dilution statutes was among the more
contentious issues addressed during the drafting of the American Law Institute's
("ALI's") new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995). When the
50. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995).
51. Id. at 777. Although only 6% of the respondents in a survey conducted for the plaintiff
believed the parody to be an actual Anheuser-Busch advertisement, the court also found a likelihood
of confusion, relying primarily on survey evidence that 58% believed that the creator of the ad would
need permission to use the Michelob name. Id. at 772-73. The latter evidence, however, does not
unambiguously establish a likelihood of confusion.
52. 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
53. Id at 41.
54. Id. at 44-45.
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advisers took up the reporters' preliminary draft of section 25 of the Restatement
("Liability Without Proof of Confusion: Dilution and Tarnishment"), there were
sharp differences on the merits. The academic members55 were generally
opposed to the whole notion of dilution protection while the trademark
practitioners5 6 generally supported it.57 The overall tenor of the discussion
was accurately captured by Geoffrey Hazard, director of the ALl, when he later
told a meeting of the Council of the ALI that all of the advisers recognize that
state dilution statutes exist, but most of them wish they did not.5
As ultimately promulgated by the ALI, the section on dilution limits the
statutory cause of action to uses that are likely to create an association between
the mark and the goods or services of the new user. On the other hand, use of
another's mark, not as a trademark to identify the new user's own products, but
to refer back to the original trademark owner, is not included within the scope
of the dilution rationale. Thus, under section 25(2), the use of another's mark
"not in a manner that is likely to associate the other's mark with the goods,
services, or business of the actor, but rather to comment on, criticize, ridicule,
parody, or disparage the other or the other's goods, services, business, or mark"
is outside the reach of the dilution action. Under the Restatement, relief for
harm resulting from such "nontrademark" use must be sought through causes
of action governing liability for injurious speech such as defamation or
disparagement, with their well-developed accommodation of free speech
rights.5 9
B. Dilution Under the Lanham Act
How large a dose of anti-dilution does the Lanham Act's new amendment
dispense? One thing is clear. Under the amendment's definition of "dilution,"
our corner of the world is now safe from DuPont shoes, Buick aspirin, and
Kodak pianos.' If it is true that the only thing worse than a bad law is a bad
55. The academic members were led primarily by Ralph Brown of the Yale Law School and David
Lange of the Duke University School of Law, and included Milton Handler, long associated with the
Columbia University School of Law.
56. The trademark practitioners included Miles Alexander of Atlanta, William Borchard of New
York, and Jerome Gilson of Chicago.
57. Personal notes from the meeting of the advisers on the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition (Oct. 27-28, 1989). See also the comments by then-Chief Judge Helen Nies of the Federal
Circuit, also an adviser: "At a drafting session on the Restatement of Law of Unfair Competition, the
proposed section on dilution was reached. The trademark lawyers were generally the advocates of
recognizing a broadly worded cause of action." Helen W. Nies, The Lanham Act-Looking at an Old
Friend From a New Perspective, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 793, 797 (1992). The International Trademark
Association also argued in favor of a broad dilution section. Letter from Richard M. Berman,
President, INTA, to Geoffrey Hazard, Director, ALl (Sept. 3, 1993).
58. Personal notes from the meeting of the Council of the ALl (Dec. 6, 1989).
59. UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 25 cmt. i.
60. "Thus, for example, the use of DuPont shoes, Buick aspirin, and Kodak pianos would be
actionable under this bill." 141 Cong. Rec. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
accord 141 Cong. Rec. H14317 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
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law applicable in only half of the states," perhaps the federal amendment will
pass as progress. But what about other kinds of uses-the "nontrademark" uses
that the Restatement tries to read out of state dilution law?
Proponents of the federal legislation, perhaps relying on rhetoric left over
from consideration of the proposal's previous incarnation in the 1988 revision,
tell us that the amendment extends protection beyond unauthorized use as a
trademark. In identical language, the House and Senate sponsors informed
their chambers that the bill would protect famous marks from uses "that blur
the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it."' 62  The analysis
accompanying the bill on its introduction in the Senate states that the definition
of dilution "is designed to encompass all forms of dilution recognized by the
courts, including disparagement. ,63 However, analysis of both the genealogy
of the amendment and its plain meaning indicates that these descriptions are
probably wrong. The amendment is (and should be) limited to DuPont
shoes-to a loss of distinctiveness occasioned by a subsequent use of the mark
as a trademark to identify another's goods or services.
1. Genealogy. When Senator Hatch introduced the dilution bill late in
1995, he assured his colleagues that the proposal "eliminates any concerns
previously voiced in congressional hearings regarding the former [f]ederal
dilution provision."' The prior proposal had been stripped from the Trade-
mark Revision Act65 before the Act's passage in 1988. Like the rest of the
Revision Act, the 1988 provisions on dilution and tarnishment had been taken
from the Report and Recommendations on the United States Trademark System
and the Lanham Act, a study prepared by the Trademark Review Commission
("TRC"), a private committee established by the United States Trademark
Association.' As in the 1995 amendment, both the TRC Report and the 1988
revision bill proposed a new subsection 43(c) that would protect against
"dilution of the distinctive quality" of a famous mark. 67  There was also a
proposed definition of "dilution" generally similar to the one included in the
61. See Richard A. De Sevo, Antidilution Laws: The Unresolved Dilemma of Preemption Under the
Lanham Act, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 300, 324 (1994).
62. 141 Cong. Rec. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added);
141 Cong. Rec. H14317 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead) (same).
63. 141 Cong. Rec. S19311 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995). In a Special Report announcing passage of
the Act, the International Trademark Association, a major proponent, stated that the new law protects
against
either the blurring of a trademark's product identification or the tarnishment of the affirmative
associations a trademark comes to convey .... Tarnishment" arises when a famous trademark is
linked to products of shoddy quality or portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to
evoke unflattering beliefs about the owner or its products.
INTA Special Report 1 (Jan. 1996) (emphasis added).
64. 141 Cong. Rec. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
65. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935.
66. The Report is reprinted in 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375 (1987).
67. S. 1883, 100th Cong. § 29 (1987); The United States Trademark Association, Trademark Review
Commission, Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK
REP 375, 458 (1987) [hereinafter TRC Report].
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1995 legislation.6' But the TRC Report and the 1988 bill included something
else-a proposed amendment to subsection 43(a) that would prohibit the use of
a mark or other conduct "likely to disparage or tarnish the mark of another.,
69
Separation of the tarnishment and dilution of distinctiveness theories was not
an accident. The TRC Report, commenting on uses that "ridicule, parody,
insult, or defame" a mark, noted that the injury is "less dilution than injury to
reputation" and that dilution law often does not "fit conceptually. 70  A
separate amendment on tarnishment and disparagement would allow courts to
grant relief "in the absence of true dilution."" Later, commenting on its
proposal for dilution protection in subsection 43(c), the TRC reaffirmed the
distinction: "The Commission believes that trademark tarnishment and
disparagement are a separate form of legal wrong, and recommends amending
Section 43(a) to deal with them.' '
Both the tarnishment and dilution proposals in the 1988 bill failed. Jerome
Gilson, who served as the reporter for the TRC and who also testified before
Congress in favor of the dilution provision, offered this account: "Unfortunately,
in the Senate bill dilution was closely linked to proposals to make trademark
disparagement and tarnishment actionable, proposals almost guaranteed to draw
First Amendment fire in Congress. The broadcast industry and the media
rallied around Representative Robert Kastenmeier and his opposition to these
proposals, including dilution protection. 7 3 Gilson lamented the demise of the
dilution portion of the bill, emphasizing that it "was never intended to prohibit
or threaten nondenominative or noncommercial expression."74
Looking back on the 1988 failure, Gilson argued that any new attempt at
dilution legislation should be limited to "trademark-like forms of commercial
speech."75 A statute narrowly tailored to "a diluting trademark on a product,
serving as an indication of source," he believed, would avoid the objections that
had scuttled the prior bill.7 6 The case for narrowing the dilution proposal was
strengthened in 1994 when the Section on Intellectual Property Law of the
American Bar Association adopted a resolution favoring passage of a federal
dilution statute but opposing passage of a statute "specifically relating to anti-
tarnishment of a trademark."77 Arguing that "the blurring aspect of dilution
should be addressed separately from the tarnishing aspect," the Section
concluded that "federal legislation on dilution specifically addressing tarnish-
68. S. 1883, 100th Cong. § 31 (1987); TRC Report, supra note 67, at 459.
69. S. 1883, 100th Cong. § 28 (1987); TRC Report, supra note 67, at 435.
70. TRC Report, supra note 67, at 433-34.
71. Id at 434.
72. Id at 455 n.134.
73. Gilson, supra note 37, at 114 (citations omitted).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 120. The focus on unauthorized trademark-like uses encompasses the most significant
threats to the value of a mark, since unlike most non-trademark uses, trademark uses typically entail
continuing, long-term use.
76. Id at 120-21.
77. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, A.B.A., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 49 (1995).
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ment does not seem advisable or realistic."78  Separation of blurring and
tarnishment issues is also consistent with the increased concentration on foreign
trade. Our obligations under the TRIPS Agreement signed as part of the
GATT negotiations extend at most to protection against unauthorized use of a
mark as a trademark.79 Tarnishment of American marks abroad unrelated to
their use as another's trademark has never been a significant trade issue.
The drafters of the 1995 amendment listened and learned. Their new
proposal retained only the dilution of distinctiveness section from the 1988
revision bill. The former provision offering protection against uses "likely to
disparage or tarnish" a mark was dropped. The drafters should be held to their
statutory language.
2. Plain Meaning. The operative language of the Trademark Dilution Act
protects "the owner of a famous mark.., against another person's commercial
use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark
becomes famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the famous
mark."'8 Dilution in turn is "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services."'" Only a use of the mark by
another as a trademark for that person's own products can lessen the capacity
of the mark to identify and distinguish the goods or services of the trademark
owner.82  Use other than as a trademark for the subsequent user's own
products is thus beyond the plain meaning of the statute. Unlike broader state
dilution acts with their references to "injury to business reputation" as well as
to "dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark,"83 the federal dilution
statute is limited to uses that blur the source significance of the mark. The
amendment's restriction to "famous" marks reinforces this interpretation.
Courts have generally restricted protection against dilution of distinctiveness
under state statutes to "strong" marks, thereby excluding "weak" marks that are
in a sense already diluted.' Such a limitation is inapplicable to protection
against tarnishment or disparagement, since even weak marks are subject to
these latter injuries.85
The dilution amendment contains a list of conduct that is not actionable
under the act, including "fair use" in "comparative commercial advertising or
78. Id. at 151-52.
79. See supra note 40.
80. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
81. Id. § 1127.
82. See UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 25 cmt. i.
83. The language of most state dilution statutes is drawn from the 1964 version of the Model State
Trademark Bill. The dilution provisions in the 1992 version of the Model Bill correspond to those in
the 1995 amendment to the Lanham Act, see 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 22.04, and thus may be
narrower in scope than the prior model provision.
84. See UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 25 cmt. e; 3 MCCARTHY, supra note
11, § 24.17. The report of the TRC noted that "[fiamous marks are most likely to be harmed by
reduced distinctiveness." TRC Report, supra note 67, at 455.
85. See UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 25 cmt. g.
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promotion," "noncommercial use," and "news reporting and news commen-
tary.,8 6  In virtually identical language, sponsors in the House and Senate
promised that the bill would "not prohibit or threaten noncommercial
expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other forms of expression that
are not a part of a commercial transaction."87  Each of these statutory
exceptions should be broadly construed.
"Fair use" is a term of art in trademark law. It refers to the nonconfusing
use of a term, not as a trademark for the user's own goods, but instead for the
purpose of communicating accurate information to prospective purchasers. For
example, the long-standing fair use provision in section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham
Act88 allows use of the original lexicographical meaning of a term that has
become another's trademark for the purpose of fairly describing the user's own
product.89 As an exception to federal dilution protection, "fair use" in
comparative advertising should thus include any use that does not create
confusion of source or otherwise misrepresent the characteristics of the user's
goods or services. The TRC had warned that the dilution proposal "should not
be used to discourage otherwise lawful comparative advertising."'9 Further
restrictions, such as those pursued in the Deere case, rely on tarnishment rather
than dilution of distinctiveness and are thus beyond the literal language of the
federal amendment. 91
The exception for "noncommercial use" should similarly be interpreted in
accordance with the broad assurances offered by the amendment's supporters.
In particular, the fact that an expressive, nontrademark use of a mark appears
on a product offered for sale in the marketplace should not exclude the use
from protection. Most forms of expression are sold to the public, including most
of the parodies, satires, and editorials referred to by the bill's sponsors on the
floors of Congress. When the product that buyers are buying is the expression
conveyed through the use of a mark, the use should not be deemed "commer-
cial." The parody of the Michelob advertisement in Anheuser-Busch should be
86. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(4) (West Supp. 1996).
87. 141 Cong. Rec. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at H14318 (daily
ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead). See also the assurances given by Senator Leahy: "I
continue to believe, as our House colleagues also affirm, that parody, satire, editorial, and other forms
of expression will remain unaffected by this legislation." Id. at S19312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy also expressed the hope "that this antidilution statute can
help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are
associated with the products and reputations of others." Id. Application of the antidilution amendment
against a defendant who uses a well-known mark to identify a site on the Internet is entirely consistent
with an interpretation limiting the amendments's scope to unauthorized use as a trade or service mark.
See Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, 1996 WL 84853 (W.D.
Wash. 1996) (preliminary injunction issued under the antidilution amendment against a defendant who
used the plaintiff's mark "to identify a sexually explicit Internet site").
88. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(4) (West Supp. 1996).
89. See also UNFAIR COMPETITION RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 28.
90. TRC Report, supra note 67, at 462.
91. In Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second
Circuit said that its decision in Deere was "a recognition of a broad view of tarnishment, where that
doctrine had been sometimes narrowly confined."
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beyond the reach of the federal dilution act, whether the expression appears in
a magazine, on a poster, or on the front of a t-shirt.
IV
CONCLUSION
Trademark legislation will increasingly be shaped by the pressures of
international commerce. As the Lanham Act ventures further from the security
of the common law, the responsibility for ensuring a reasonable balance
between private rights and public access will fall more heavily on the courts.
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act should be limited to the use of a famous
mark as a trademark for the user's own product. Allowing a few questionable
parodies or off-color t-shirts and some overly aggressive comparative advertise-
ments is a small price for maintaining access to symbols that have become such
important ingredients in our public dialogue.
